Beyond Cynicism.

[War God]

It has always seemed to me that, in the third treatise, Nietzsche spoke favourably of the ascetic ideal in relation to the philosopher---in fact, to "all great, prolific, inventive spirits" (section 8). In the context mentioned he's speaking of "the three great catchphrases of the ascetic ideal": "poverty, humility, and chastity" (ibid.). And in Beyond Good and Evil (to which the Genealogy is a sequel), he speaks of the tendency of cynics to view man "as a belly with two different requirements, and a head with one" (i.e., to view "hunger, sexual desire, and vanity as the real and only motives of human actions") (section 26). May we make the following connections?

hunger - poverty (- princes*)
sexual desire - chastity (- women*)
humility - vanity (- fame*)

*"We can recognize a philosopher by the following: he walks away from three glittering and garish things---fame, princes, and women." (GM III, 8.)

Vanity and pride are poles, just as weakness and strength are poles: "weakness" is just a relative absence of strength; likewise, "vanity" is just a relative absence, a relatively low degree, of pride.

According to Laurence Lampert, however (in his 'Nietzsche's Teaching'), Zarathustra seeks something above pride, even: namely, victory. Could this mean Nietzsche/Zarathustra is favourably disposed toward the ascetic ideal, or at least the three catchphrases of the ascetic ideal, where they represent "sacrifices" for the sake of something higher? The spirituality of by far the most men, not just "the average man" but also the cynic (BGE 26) may be vanity or pride; but the spirituality of the "fewest", "the most spiritual men" (AC 57), may be something higher.

And of course sexual desire, physically the lowest of the three motivations of man recognised by the cynic, is not the most basic form of what drives all life: the will to power. So from below to above, we have:

the will to power;
sexual desire;
hunger;
vanity;
the most spiritual will to power: philosophy (BGE 9).

(Note that this order does not exclude possible intermediaries.)

[Enjolras]

Ascetic lambastment is not entirely of the negative variety, “so many bridges to independence are shown in the acetic ideal” – section 8 “A certain asceticism, a grimly gay whole-hearted renunciation, is, as we have seen, one of the most favourable conditions for the highest intellectualism...” – section 9. So I am sure it will warm your cockles to know that I do agree with you, but admittedly to a limited extent.

For a start there is not an economy of “sacrifice” at work, to take an extreme example the sacrifice of Isaac... bump off your only son who you absolutely cherish (has value to oneself) in the name of God. In fact quite the opposite is the case...

“In this attitude there is not a trace of chastity, by reason of any acetic scruple or hatred of the flesh, any more than it is chastity for an athlete or a jockey to abstain from women; it is rather the will of the dominant instinct, at any rate, during the period of their advanced philosophic pregnancy” - Section 8

So it seems that at least one catch word of the ascetic ideal (chastity), gets detached from the roots of the ascetic – in the specific context of Philosophers. It is as if Daddy stopped loving Isaac, and then killed him which is not then a sacrifice.

Indeed this can be discerned a little later on when Nietzsche talks about the dominating power absorbing the lesser powers which involve no sacrifice as sacrifices take place at the conscious level.

“Could this mean Nietzsche/Zarathustra is favourably disposed toward the ascetic ideal, or at least the three catchphrases of the ascetic ideal, where they represent "sacrifices" for the sake of something higher?”

No.

I would reword it as follows...

Nietzsche seems to de-asceticize the three catch words of the ascetic ideal in the context of exploring the “type” philosopher, they [catch words]are derivative from the dominating power absorbing lesser powers so are at best a secondary production and emphatically not something higher to aim for.


Enjolras.

[War God]

Ascetic lambastment is not entirely of the negative variety, “so many bridges to independence are shown in the acetic ideal” – section 8 “A certain asceticism, a grimly gay whole-hearted renunciation, is, as we have seen, one of the most favourable conditions for the highest intellectualism...” – section 9. So I am sure it will warm your cockles to know that I do agree with you, but admittedly to a limited extent.

For a start there is not an economy of “sacrifice” at work, to take an extreme example the sacrifice of Isaac... bump off your only son who you absolutely cherish (has value to oneself) in the name of God. In fact quite the opposite is the case...

“In this attitude there is not a trace of chastity, by reason of any acetic scruple or hatred of the flesh, any more than it is chastity for an athlete or a jockey to abstain from women; it is rather the will of the dominant instinct, at any rate, during the period of their advanced philosophic pregnancy” - Section 8

So it seems that at least one catch word of the ascetic ideal (chastity), gets detached from the roots of the ascetic – in the specific context of Philosophers. It is as if Daddy stopped loving Isaac, and then killed him which is not then a sacrifice.

But philosophical celibacy need not be a case of having "stopped loving" the pleasures of the flesh. Though in Schopenhauer's case, for instance, the philosopher came to hate those pleasures, that didn't mean he ever stopped loving them. What he hated was that he could not indulge in them without his spirituality suffering from it. As in the case of Abraham, Schopenhauer sacrificed something he loved to something he loved even more.

Indeed this can be discerned a little later on when Nietzsche talks about the dominating power absorbing the lesser powers which involve no sacrifice as sacrifices take place at the conscious level.

Well, I think there are many levels of consciousness (e.g., I also think the amoeba is conscious---if not the stone...).

“Could this mean Nietzsche/Zarathustra is favourably disposed toward the ascetic ideal, or at least the three catchphrases of the ascetic ideal, where they represent "sacrifices" for the sake of something higher?”

No.

I would reword it as follows...

Nietzsche seems to de-asceticize the three catch words of the ascetic ideal in the context of exploring the “type” philosopher, they [catch words]are derivative from the dominating power absorbing lesser powers so are at best a secondary production and emphatically not something higher to aim for.

But then, that wasn't what I said: by "something higher", I was referring to a high spirituality, not to abstinence from sex, luxury, or honours.

[Enjolras]

But then, that wasn't what I said: by "something higher", I was referring to a high spirituality, not to abstinence from sex, luxury, or honours.

I think you were a little bit ambiguous exactly to what you were referring to...

“Could this mean Nietzsche/Zarathustra is favourably disposed toward the ascetic ideal, or at least the three catchphrases of the ascetic ideal, where they represent "sacrifices" for the sake of something higher?”

Sidestepping the fact that I do not agree that Nietzsche/Zarathustra is interchangeable, I do not see any correspondence between acetic ideal and high spirituality.

“What is the meaning of a philosopher paying homage to acetic ideals? We get now, at any rate, a first hint; he wishes to escape from a torture” - Section 6

This torture I equate with the scourge of resentment and bad conscience, and the ascetic ideal is to make existing amongst this illness liveable.

The ascetic ideal has corrupted not only health and taste, there are also third, forth, fifth and sixth things it has corrupted – I shall take care not to go through the catalogue (when should I get to the end?) – section 23

And again in no uncertain terms...

“The ascetic ideal has an aim – this goal is putting it generally, that all the other interests of human life should, measured by its standard, appear petty and narrow... it forbids any other interpretation, any other end...” - section 23 - in fact read the whole of 23.

If anything the ascetic ideal is the expression of a will, the triumph of reactive sickly will. It is not immediately obvious why a higher spirit would want to be tarred with that brush.

"It has always seemed to me that, in the third treatise, Nietzsche spoke favourably of the ascetic ideal in relation to the philosopher"

Agreed.

Enjolras.

[War God]

But then, that wasn't what I said: by "something higher", I was referring to a high spirituality, not to abstinence from sex, luxury, or honours.

I think you were a little bit ambiguous exactly to what you were referring to...

Maybe I was. English is not my native language.

“Could this mean Nietzsche/Zarathustra is favourably disposed toward the ascetic ideal, or at least the three catchphrases of the ascetic ideal, where they represent "sacrifices" for the sake of something higher?”

Sidestepping the fact that I do not agree that Nietzsche/Zarathustra is interchangeable, I do not see any correspondence between acetic ideal and high spirituality.

Well, Zarathustra is not just a character in a book, but the writer's spokesperson.

Open still remaineth a free life for great souls. Verily, he who possesseth little is so much the less possessed: blessed be moderate poverty!
[TSZ, Of the New Idol.]

Is it not better to fall into the hands of a murderer than into the dreams of a lustful woman?
And just look at these men: their eye saith it---they know nothing better on earth than to lie with a woman.
[ibid., Of Chastity.]

Then was there again spoken unto me without voice: "What matter about thyself? Thou art not yet humble enough for me. Humility hath the hardest skin."
[ibid., The Stillest Hour.]

Apparently Zarathustra teaches a free life for great souls, in moderate poverty; free from lustful women, a life devoted to something better than lying with a woman; a hard life, for which the skin of humility is needed.

As for the correspondence between the ascetic ideal and high spirituality:

So what, then, does the ascetic ideal mean as far as a philosopher is concerned? My answer is---you will have guessed it long ago: when gazing at its countenance, the philosopher smiles at an optimal set of conditions for the loftiest and boldest spirituality[.]
[GM III, 7.]

Cf. the whole of section 8, as well as the opening sentence of section 9:

A certain asceticism, as we have seen, a hard and cheerful renunciation with the best will, belongs to those conditions favorable to the highest spirituality and is also among its most natural consequences.
[9.]

“What is the meaning of a philosopher paying homage to acetic ideals? We get now, at any rate, a first hint; he wishes to escape from a torture” - Section 6

This torture I equate with the scourge of resentment and bad conscience, and the ascetic ideal is to make existing amongst this illness liveable.

That equation can only spring from not having read the following sections well enough:

Let's be careful not to create gloomy images out of that word "torture."
[section 7.]

I'd say reread sections 7 and 8. Even if in Schopenhauer's case there was probably ressentiment and bad conscience, that was not what was typical about his case. In section 8 at least I discern not a hint of ressentiment.

The ascetic ideal has corrupted not only health and taste, there are also third, forth, fifth and sixth things it has corrupted – I shall take care not to go through the catalogue (when should I get to the end?) – section 23

And again in no uncertain terms...

Yes. So my question is: what is the relation between Nietzsche's evident praise of the ascetic ideal (or its catchphrases) and his condemnation of that ideal? It must happen somewhere between section 9 and section 23. I think the following is crucial:

[F]or the longest time on earth philosophy would not have been at all possible without an ascetic cover and costume, without an ascetic misunderstanding of the self. To put the matter explicitly: up to the most recent times the ascetic priest has provided the repellent and dark caterpillar form which was the only one in which philosophy could live and creep around... Has that really changed? Is that colorful and dangerous winged creature, that "spirit" which this caterpillar hid within itself, at last really been released and allowed out into the light, thanks to a sunnier, warmer, brighter world? Nowadays do we have sufficient pride, daring, bravery, self-certainty, spiritual will, will to assume responsibility, freedom of the will so that from now on "the philosopher" is---possible on earth?...
[section 10, end.]

Note that Nietzsche says "caterpillar form". It seems Nietzsche does not mean that the "ascetic priest", the "ascetic cover and costume", is only a cocoon, in which philosophy was hidden, and from which it might emerge and show its true form. Does philosophy have a "true form"? Do not all forms obscure it a bit? My suggestion is that the transformation from caterpillar to butterfly be a transition from ascetic cover and costume to pagan cover and costume:

To determine: whether the typical religious man [is] a form of decadence (the great innovators are one and all morbid and epileptic); but are we not here omitting one type of religious man, the pagan? Is the pagan cult not a form of thanksgiving and affirmation of life? Must its highest representative not be an apology for and deification of life? The type of a well-constituted and ecstatically overflowing spirit! The type of a spirit that takes into itself and redeems the contradictions and questionable aspects of existence!
It is here I set the Dionysus of the Greeks: the religious affirmation of life, life whole and not denied or in part; (typical---that the sexual act arouses profundity, mystery, reverence).
[The Will to Power, section 1052.]

At the end of TSZ, Part III, Zarathustra achieves the redemption from the spirit of revenge, by willing the eternal recurrence. The eternal recurrence is philosophy's natural edifying teaching. And with it he instigates the return of Dionysus (TSZ, Of the Great Longing). But the philosopher must still, and probably for a long time, and perhaps forever, be subtle, silent, cautious. He must always wear masks---and in fact, masks will grow around him naturally (cf. BGE, chapter 9). He will always be a priest in the eyes of the people---if not a criminal...

“The ascetic ideal has an aim – this goal is putting it generally, that all the other interests of human life should, measured by its standard, appear petty and narrow... it forbids any other interpretation, any other end...” - section 23 - in fact read the whole of 23.

If anything the ascetic ideal is the expression of a will, the triumph of reactive sickly will. It is not immediately obvious why a higher spirit would want to be tarred with that brush.

"It has always seemed to me that, in the third treatise, Nietzsche spoke favourably of the ascetic ideal in relation to the philosopher"

Agreed.

Enjolras.

[Enjolras]

“Well, Zarathustra is not just a character in a book, but the writer's spokesperson.”

Yes I agree with the gist of what you say, however Zarathustra = Nietzsche is a metonymy which I cannot ascribe too.

“Apparently Zarathustra teaches a free life for great souls, in moderate poverty; free from lustful women, a life devoted to something better than lying with a woman; a hard life, for which the skin of humility is needed.”

The status of women in Nietzsche writing is a complex affair i.e. “truth as women” which would change the meaning of the sentence “...Zarathustra teaches a life... free from lustful truth”.

“Is it not better to fall into the hands of a murderer than into the dreams of a lustful woman?
And just look at these men: their eye saith it---they know nothing better on earth than to lie with a woman”

- Better to be the destroyer of values then be seduced by unproblematic truth.

“As for the correspondence between the ascetic ideal and high spirituality:
So what, then, does the ascetic ideal mean as far as a philosopher is concerned? My answer is---you will have guessed it long ago: when gazing at its countenance, the philosopher smiles at an optimal set of conditions for the loftiest and boldest spirituality[.]
[GM III, 7.]”

In the stead of “spirituality” in my version of GM the translation is “intellectuality”. But I consider my version to be a shabby translation. However, it continues...

“...loftiest and boldest intellectuality; he does not thereby deny “existence,” he rather affirms thereby his existence and only his existence, and this perhaps to the point of not being far off the blasphemous wish “let the world end, but let there be philosophy, let there be me!””

Firstly on to the status of “Philosopher”, it is a type and he is examining the meaning and how the ascetic ideal is used by the philosopher type. It is distinct from and not contingent to overman, or Zarathustra. The correlation between ascetic ideal and higher spirituality is based upon (dare I say it?) a confusion, or a reduction of the type philosopher to high spirituality.

In section 7 Nietzsche lampoons the Philosophers use of the acetic ideal and equates it with the Kantian “thing-in-itself” which he ridicules.

“That equation can only spring from not having read the following sections well enough:
Let's be careful not to create gloomy images out of that word "torture."
[section 7.]

I'd say reread sections 7 and 8. Even if in Schopenhauer's case there was probably ressentiment and bad conscience, that was not what was typical about his case. In section 8 at least I discern not a hint of ressentiment.”

Touché!

However in my version it is as follows...

“Let us beware of making dismal faces at the word “torture” – there is certainly in this case enough to deduct, enough to discount – there is even something to laugh at.”

Which I interpret as a dig at philosophers for wanting to escape “torture”, for missing (as paradoxically as it may sound) a certain joy in staying with torture. What was typical in Schopenhauer case is that he was a philosopher; he was used as an example of a philosopher.

“Yes. So my question is: what is the relation between Nietzsche's evident praise of the ascetic ideal (or its catchphrases) and his condemnation of that ideal? It must happen somewhere between section 9 and section 23. I think the following is crucial:”

What is evident is Nietzsche’s highlighting the fact that philosophers (as a type) praise the ascetic ideal. The condemnation of the ideal is necessary in order to create something new in its place.

Note that Nietzsche says "caterpillar form". It seems Nietzsche does not mean that the "ascetic priest", the "ascetic cover and costume", is only a cocoon, in which philosophy was hidden, and from which it might emerge and show its true form. Does philosophy have a "true form"? Do not all forms obscure it a bit? My suggestion is that the transformation from caterpillar to butterfly be a transition from ascetic cover and costume to pagan cover and costume:

I think you are mistaken in your interpretation. What indeed Nietzsche is saying is that the condition of possibility of Philosophy is a certain distance from “life” itself, or to be cut off from it. They had to wear the mask of the priest which tamed the radical potential due to the religious milieu they co-existed in which prevented a wholesome critique. “Has that really changed?” – a rhetorical question (A. no) and an open challenge to “higher spirits”. To stop philosophers from swallowing their own tail – Urobos, to take on the responsibility of change.


Enjolras.

[War God]

“Well, Zarathustra is not just a character in a book, but the writer's spokesperson.”

Yes I agree with the gist of what you say, however Zarathustra = Nietzsche is a metonymy which I cannot ascribe too.

Alright, neither can I.

“Apparently Zarathustra teaches a free life for great souls, in moderate poverty; free from lustful women, a life devoted to something better than lying with a woman; a hard life, for which the skin of humility is needed.”

The status of women in Nietzsche writing is a complex affair i.e. “truth as women” which would change the meaning of the sentence “...Zarathustra teaches a life... free from lustful truth”.

If truth is a woman, that does not mean all women are truth.

“Is it not better to fall into the hands of a murderer than into the dreams of a lustful woman?
And just look at these men: their eye saith it---they know nothing better on earth than to lie with a woman”

- Better to be the destroyer of values then be seduced by unproblematic truth.

Well, he's rather saying "better have one's values destroyed by a destroyer of values than" etc. But I repeat: you cannot simply substitute the word "truth" for the word "woman".

“As for the correspondence between the ascetic ideal and high spirituality:
So what, then, does the ascetic ideal mean as far as a philosopher is concerned? My answer is---you will have guessed it long ago: when gazing at its countenance, the philosopher smiles at an optimal set of conditions for the loftiest and boldest spirituality[.]
[GM III, 7.]”

In the stead of “spirituality” in my version of GM the translation is “intellectuality”. But I consider my version to be a shabby translation.

In the German it's Geistigkeit, which means both. Consider Kaufmann's footnote to WP 984.

However, it continues...

“...loftiest and boldest intellectuality; he does not thereby deny “existence,” he rather affirms thereby his existence and only his existence, and this perhaps to the point of not being far off the blasphemous wish “let the world end, but let there be philosophy, let there be me!””

Firstly on to the status of “Philosopher”, it is a type and he is examining the meaning and how the ascetic ideal is used by the philosopher type. It is distinct from and not contingent to overman, or Zarathustra. The correlation between ascetic ideal and higher spirituality is based upon (dare I say it?) a confusion, or a reduction of the type philosopher to high spirituality.

Well, in the aforementioned footnote, Kaufmann does indeed say:

[A]ll the men he most admired were, without exception, great intellects [grosse Geister]---but not merely great intellects.

One cannot belong to the philosopher type without a high Geistigkeit, but that indeed doesn't mean that's all there is to it.

In section 7 Nietzsche lampoons the Philosophers use of the acetic ideal and equates it with the Kantian “thing-in-itself” which he ridicules.

I'm sorry, but you're really not reading well. What he calls a "thing-in-itself" is that "both ["a genuine philosophical irritability with and rancor against sensuousness" and "a real philosophical bias and affection favoring the whole ascetic ideal"] belong to the philosophical type: if both are missing in a philosopher then he is always only a so-called philosopher".

“That equation can only spring from not having read the following sections well enough:
Let's be careful not to create gloomy images out of that word "torture."
[section 7.]

I'd say reread sections 7 and 8. Even if in Schopenhauer's case there was probably ressentiment and bad conscience, that was not what was typical about his case. In section 8 at least I discern not a hint of ressentiment.”

Touché!

However in my version it is as follows...

“Let us beware of making dismal faces at the word “torture” – there is certainly in this case enough to deduct, enough to discount – there is even something to laugh at.”

Which I interpret as a dig at philosophers for wanting to escape “torture”, for missing (as paradoxically as it may sound) a certain joy in staying with torture.

Well, though your translation is superior to mine, your interpretation is not: for what he means is that much of Schopenhauer's torture is funny, not his will to escape torture.

What was typical in Schopenhauer case is that he was a philosopher; he was used as an example of a philosopher.

“Yes. So my question is: what is the relation between Nietzsche's evident praise of the ascetic ideal (or its catchphrases) and his condemnation of that ideal? It must happen somewhere between section 9 and section 23. I think the following is crucial:”

What is evident is Nietzsche’s highlighting the fact that philosophers (as a type) praise the ascetic ideal. The condemnation of the ideal is necessary in order to create something new in its place.

But my point is that this need not mean that the three "catchphrases" are to be replaced with something new.

Note that Nietzsche says "caterpillar form". It seems Nietzsche does not mean that the "ascetic priest", the "ascetic cover and costume", is only a cocoon, in which philosophy was hidden, and from which it might emerge and show its true form. Does philosophy have a "true form"? Do not all forms obscure it a bit? My suggestion is that the transformation from caterpillar to butterfly be a transition from ascetic cover and costume to pagan cover and costume:

I think you are mistaken in your interpretation. What indeed Nietzsche is saying is that the condition of possibility of Philosophy is a certain distance from “life” itself, or to be cut off from it.

Only from everyday life:

[T]he redeeming man of great love and contempt, the creative spirit whose compelling strength will not let him rest in any aloofness or any beyond, whose isolation is misunderstood by the people as if it were flight from reality---while it is only his absorption, immersion, penetration into reality, so that, when he one day emerges again into the light, he may bring home the redemption of this reality: its redemption from the curse that the hitherto reigning ideal has laid upon it. This man of the future, who will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism[.]
[GM II, 24.]

It's evident to me that Nietzsche's describing his Zarathustra here (cf. Lampert, 'Nietzsche's Teaching').

The ascetic ideal is to be replaced, but the new ideal does not replace the old ideal's catchphrases; it only revalues them (as Nietzsche does in GM III, 7-8). The mature Zarathustra is moderately poor, naturally chaste, and robustly humble. His victories do not lie in the domain of material riches, sexual conquests, or fame and glory;

O Will, thou change of every need, my needfulness! Spare me for one great victory!
[TSZ, Of Old and New Tables, 30.]

They had to wear the mask of the priest which tamed the radical potential due to the religious milieu they co-existed in which prevented a wholesome critique.

Yes; but though I do think they must now shed that mask, that doesn't mean they shouldn't be moderately poor, chaste, and humble. For these things are natural necessities for a high Geistigkeit: poverty because he who possesses less is less possessed; chastity because "there is only one kind of energy" (as Nietzsche says in The Will to Power, in a similar context); and humility because the philosopher must not invite rebellion---rebellion to the right, the natural, order, in which the sage ranks supreme (the word "philosopher" was itself coined out of such humility!).

“Has that really changed?” – a rhetorical question (A. no) and an open challenge to “higher spirits”. To stop philosophers from swallowing their own tail – Urobos, to take on the responsibility of change.


Enjolras.

[Enjolras]

If truth is a woman, that does not mean all women are truth.

Correct however I believe you miss the slippage between signifier/signified that Nietzsche exposes which undermines an unproblematic didactic reading of him – a gesture which he embodies through the text.

“Is it not better to fall into the hands of a murderer than into the dreams of a lustful woman?
And just look at these men: their eye saith it---they know nothing better on earth than to lie with a woman”
- Better to be the destroyer of values then be seduced by unproblematic truth.

Well, he's rather saying "better have one's values destroyed by a destroyer of values than" etc. But I repeat: you cannot simply substitute the word "truth" for the word "woman".

It not the case of a “simple” substitution, as that presupposes in the first place an unproblematic signifier/signified relationship.

Derrida gave three positions (which are not to be taken as totalizing) of Nietzsche relationship to women in his texts...

The women...
a)...condemned as... figure or power of lying... he was, he feared such a castrated women
b)... condemned as... figure or power of truth.. he was, he feared such a castrating women
c)... Recognized, beyond this double negation, affirmed as the affirmative, dissimulating, artistic, Dionysiac... He was, he loved such an affirmative women

The above embodies b).

In the German it's Geistigkeit, which means both. Consider Kaufmann's footnote to WP 984.

Thank you for the reference, I have learnt something new.

In section 7 Nietzsche lampoons the Philosophers use of the acetic ideal and equates it with the Kantian “thing-in-itself” which he ridicules.

I'm sorry, but you're really not reading well. What he calls a "thing-in-itself" is that "both ["a genuine philosophical irritability with and rancour against sensuousness" and "a real philosophical bias and affection favoring the whole ascetic ideal"] belong to the philosophical type: if both are missing in a philosopher then he is always only a so-called philosopher".

Whoa hombre!

This is where we differ, favouring of ascetic ideal I view as a negative thing, and Nietzsche believe it is something to be overcome which means not to stop philosopherizing but to overcome the Philosopher type.

“The property of a thing are effects on other “things”: if one removes other “things,” then a thing has no properties...”

- From W2P Thing-in-itself and Appearance, 577

I made an analogy between the use of the ascetic ideal and a thing in itself... what I intended to convey is that the use of the ascetic ideal is a repression of life itself (life as existence or exposure in its "totality" - note the scare quotes!) causing a distance from it which is comparable with N’s critique of the thing-in-itself which represents a closure or rejection of life (life as exposure).

Which I interpret as a dig at philosophers for wanting to escape “torture”, for missing (as paradoxically as it may sound) a certain joy in staying with torture.

Well, though your translation is superior to mine, your interpretation is not: for what he means is that much of Schopenhauer's torture is funny, not his will to escape torture.

Your interpretation of my interpretation is off. Don’t worry though; I forgive you as your position is not so different to mine.

What is evident is Nietzsche’s highlighting the fact that philosophers (as a type) praise the ascetic ideal. The condemnation of the ideal is necessary in order to create something new in its place.

But my point is that this need not mean that the three "catchphrases" are to be replaced with something new.

Yes I understand your view, however being your interlocutor I’m arguing that you are mistaken in your reading.

I think you are mistaken in your interpretation. What indeed Nietzsche is saying is that the condition of possibility of Philosophy is a certain distance from “life” itself, or to be cut off from it.

“Only from everyday life:

[T]he redeeming man of great love and contempt, the creative spirit whose compelling strength will not let him rest in any aloofness or any beyond, whose isolation is misunderstood by the people as if it were flight from reality---while it is only his absorption, immersion, penetration into reality, so that, when he one day emerges again into the light, he may bring home the redemption of this reality: its redemption from the curse that the hitherto reigning ideal has laid upon it. This man of the future, who will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism[.]
[GM II, 24.]

It's evident to me that Nietzsche's describing his Zarathustra here (cf. Lampert, 'Nietzsche's Teaching').”

Indeed you are correct however our senses of Zarathustra differ. Namely you sublimate the philosopher type into Zarathustra, while I on the other hand hold Zarathustra as someone who overcomes the philosopher type. Your reading only allows a profit which represses his destruction or dismantaling.

What he retreats from is not "everyday life", but ascetism. Or "everyday life' is an expression of acestism.

“The ascetic ideal is to be replaced, but the new ideal does not replace the old ideal's catchphrases; it only revalues them (as Nietzsche does in GM III, 7-8). The mature Zarathustra is moderately poor, naturally chaste, and robustly humble. His victories do not lie in the domain of material riches, sexual conquests, or fame and glory;
O Will, thou change of every need, my needfulness! Spare me for one great victory!
[TSZ, Of Old and New Tables, 30.]”

Again here is where we differ; we are not to replace one ideal with another but to think in ways OTHER than ideals. That is the challenge to the higher spirit.


Enjolras.

[War God]

If truth is a woman, that does not mean all women are truth.

Correct however I believe you miss the slippage between signifier/signified that Nietzsche exposes which undermines an unproblematic didactic reading of him – a gesture which he embodies through the text.

What "slippage" between "signifier/signified"? Where does Nietzsche expose that?

“Is it not better to fall into the hands of a murderer than into the dreams of a lustful woman?
And just look at these men: their eye saith it---they know nothing better on earth than to lie with a woman”
- Better to be the destroyer of values then be seduced by unproblematic truth.

Well, he's rather saying "better have one's values destroyed by a destroyer of values than" etc. But I repeat: you cannot simply substitute the word "truth" for the word "woman".

It not the case of a “simple” substitution, as that presupposes in the first place an unproblematic signifier/signified relationship.

Derrida gave three positions (which are not to be taken as totalizing) of Nietzsche relationship to women in his texts...

The women...
a)...condemned as... figure or power of lying... he was, he feared such a castrated women
b)... condemned as... figure or power of truth.. he was, he feared such a castrating women
c)... Recognized, beyond this double negation, affirmed as the affirmative, dissimulating, artistic, Dionysiac... He was, he loved such an affirmative women

Are you aware that this is not even English? I smell postmodernism here...

"Nietzsche was a women"...

The above embodies b).

If you says so...

In the German it's Geistigkeit, which means both. Consider Kaufmann's footnote to WP 984.

Thank you for the reference, I have learnt something new.

In section 7 Nietzsche lampoons the Philosophers use of the acetic ideal and equates it with the Kantian “thing-in-itself” which he ridicules.

I'm sorry, but you're really not reading well. What he calls a "thing-in-itself" is that "both ["a genuine philosophical irritability with and rancour against sensuousness" and "a real philosophical bias and affection favoring the whole ascetic ideal"] belong to the philosophical type: if both are missing in a philosopher then he is always only a so-called philosopher".

Whoa hombre!

This is where we differ, favouring of ascetic ideal I view as a negative thing, and Nietzsche believe it is something to be overcome which means not to stop philosopherizing but to overcome the Philosopher type.

Wrong; his so-called "overcoming" of the philosopher type, he himself called "philosophers of the future". The difference is that the philosophers of the future, one of which was Nietzsche/Zarathustra, are actually wise in that they have seen the character of all beings---will to power---and take the necessary step of willing (in Nietzsche's or Zarathustra's case) or affirming (in the case of those after Nietzsche/Zarathustra) the eternal recurrence. See Lampert, 'Nietzsche's Teaching'.

“The property of a thing are effects on other “things”: if one removes other “things,” then a thing has no properties...”

- From W2P Thing-in-itself and Appearance, 577

I made an analogy between the use of the ascetic ideal and a thing in itself... what I intended to convey is that the use of the ascetic ideal is a repression of life itself (life as existence or exposure in its "totality" - note the scare quotes!) causing a distance from it which is comparable with N’s critique of the thing-in-itself which represents a closure or rejection of life (life as exposure).

Fair enough, but that isn't what the phrase "thing-in-itself" in section 7 refers to.

Which I interpret as a dig at philosophers for wanting to escape “torture”, for missing (as paradoxically as it may sound) a certain joy in staying with torture.

Well, though your translation is superior to mine, your interpretation is not: for what he means is that much of Schopenhauer's torture is funny, not his will to escape torture.

Your interpretation of my interpretation is off. Don’t worry though; I forgive you as your position is not so different to mine.

Hm, I guess I see now. I interpreted the "dig" as what was funny, whereas you probably meant the "joy". Well, I'm pretty sure Nietzsche did not find joy in staying with that "torture":

[W]hat Heraclitus was getting away from is still the same thing we go out of our way to escape: the noise and the democratic chatter of the Ephesians, their politics, their news about the "empire" [Reich] (you understand I mean the Persians), their daily market junk---for we philosophers need peace and quiet from one thing above all---from anything to do with "today."
[section 8.]

What is evident is Nietzsche’s highlighting the fact that philosophers (as a type) praise the ascetic ideal. The condemnation of the ideal is necessary in order to create something new in its place.

But my point is that this need not mean that the three "catchphrases" are to be replaced with something new.

Yes I understand your view, however being your interlocutor I’m arguing that you are mistaken in your reading.

I think you are mistaken in your interpretation. What indeed Nietzsche is saying is that the condition of possibility of Philosophy is a certain distance from “life” itself, or to be cut off from it.

“Only from everyday life:

[T]he redeeming man of great love and contempt, the creative spirit whose compelling strength will not let him rest in any aloofness or any beyond, whose isolation is misunderstood by the people as if it were flight from reality---while it is only his absorption, immersion, penetration into reality, so that, when he one day emerges again into the light, he may bring home the redemption of this reality: its redemption from the curse that the hitherto reigning ideal has laid upon it. This man of the future, who will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism[.]
[GM II, 24.]

It's evident to me that Nietzsche's describing his Zarathustra here (cf. Lampert, 'Nietzsche's Teaching').”

Indeed you are correct however our senses of Zarathustra differ. Namely you sublimate the philosopher type into Zarathustra, while I on the other hand hold Zarathustra as someone who overcomes the philosopher type. Your reading only allows a profit which represses his destruction or dismantaling.

Well, the philosopher does have to overcome his ressentiment. But that does not make him something else than a philosopher; to the contrary, that first allows him to become a true philosopher (a sage):

Concerning life, the wisest men of all ages have judged alike: it is no good...
[Twilight, Socrates, 1, opening sentence.]

"Will to Truth" do ye call it, ye wisest ones, that which impelleth you and maketh you ardent?
[TSZ, Of Self-Surpassing, opening sentence.]

What impels them and makes them ardent is a will to power; and the will to power must will the eternal recurrence if it's not to be a will to vengeance.

What he retreats from is not "everyday life", but ascetism. Or "everyday life' is an expression of acestism.

“The ascetic ideal is to be replaced, but the new ideal does not replace the old ideal's catchphrases; it only revalues them (as Nietzsche does in GM III, 7-8). The mature Zarathustra is moderately poor, naturally chaste, and robustly humble. His victories do not lie in the domain of material riches, sexual conquests, or fame and glory;
O Will, thou change of every need, my needfulness! Spare me for one great victory!
[TSZ, Of Old and New Tables, 30.]”

Again here is where we differ; we are not to replace one ideal with another but to think in ways OTHER than ideals. That is the challenge to the higher spirit.

Wrong:

Above all, a counter-ideal [to the ascetic ideal] was lacking---until Zarathustra.
[Ecce Homo, on the Genealogy.]

[Enjolras]

“What "slippage" between "signifier/signified"? Where does Nietzsche expose that?”

In the interests of keeping a hand on the thread and from stopping it getting to unwieldy I will defer on this occasion... however if you are lucky I may start another thread on the topic.

“Are you aware that this is not even English? I smell postmodernism here...”

I get the whiff of lazy thinking, subsuming diverse thinking into a populist empty heading.

Well, the philosopher does have to overcome his ressentiment. But that does not make him something else than a philosopher; to the contrary, that first allows him to become a true philosopher (a sage):

I agree... and by extension bad conscience as well. However our difference revolves around the status of the Philosophical type. Typology is a category of analysis itself. It is where the origins of a value is found. The philosopher type is NOT a practicing Philosopher, but is the source of a certain set of values which determine a certain variety of philosopher. These values are subject to change; henceforth you get different ‘types’ which give rise to the philosopher of the future.

“Wrong; his so-called "overcoming" of the philosopher type, he himself called "philosophers of the future". The difference is that the philosophers of the future, one of which was Nietzsche/Zarathustra, are actually wise in that they have seen the character of all beings---will to power---and take the necessary step of willing (in Nietzsche's or Zarathustra's case) or affirming (in the case of those after Nietzsche/Zarathustra) the eternal recurrence. See Lampert, 'Nietzsche's Teaching'.”

I will attempt to clarify my position in particular reference to your original claims. Nietzsche wanted to overcome a certain and particular philosophical type, not philosophy itself. The philosopher of the future would be of a different type. When Nietzsche talks of the philosopher type, he is referring to a particular philosopher who pays homage to the acetic ideal. Zarathustra/future philosopher/higher spirit is of a different type to that of before.

“Above all, a counter-ideal [to the ascetic ideal] was lacking---until Zarathustra.
[Ecce Homo, on the Genealogy.]”

Exactly! A counter-ideal. Counter which has conations of oppose, contradict, defy argue against... He does not want a replacement of an ascetic ideal with another ideal. He is arguing for another way of thinking one that does not devalue life. Where does it say to replace the acetic ideal with another ideal?

What is the opposite of the ideal if the ideal is a closure or a restriction of life? It is openness the embracement and affirmation of difference and change which by its nature must be open.

That affirmation can not come from the acetic ideal.

------

Looking into my crystal ball I forsee you responding with the "eternal-will-of-the-same"...




Enjolras.